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Abstract 
In this thesis, I investigate the effects of decentralized public employment services (PES) on employment and 
participation in active labor market policies. Decentralized provision of employment services could be more 
effective than central provision, since local offices could take into account local preferences and conditions 
(Oates, 1972). There is, however, a trade-off: municipalities may try to shift costs to the central government 
or to or direct job seekers to less effective activation programs (Mergele & Weber, 2020).  
 
I analyze the effects of decentralized employment services utilizing two large-scale municipal employment 
trials conducted in Finland during 2012–2015 and 2017–2018. In the first trial, 61 municipalities arranged 
complimentary employment services to job seekers, while the centralized employment offices were still 
responsible for the basic services. In the second trial, 23 participating municipalities were given responsibility 
to arrange all employment services to certain target groups of job seekers, who can be identified from data. 
The second trial answers the question whether municipalities were better at arranging job services than the 
centralized offices, whereas the first trial is utilized to answer whether the additional decentralized services 
had employment effects. 
 
In the analysis of the first trial the treated unit is the municipality, since the participants cannot be identified. 
In three specifications, I find an effect of 0.5 percentage points on employment, but the effect is not significant 
in three other specifications. No effects on unemployment are found in any specifications. This could mean 
that the trial increased employment of individuals outside the labour force.  
 
The second trial either increased or had no effects on extended unemployment, depending on area. The 
probability of registered unemployment decreases in some areas, but this is offset by increased activation, 
resulting in no effect or an increase in extended unemployment. This means that the second trial mainly 
increased participation in ALMPs without increasing employment in the 1.5-year period for which data is 
available. In addition to this, I find evidence that municipalities may try to optimize their own budgets in 
expense of the central government: in Pirkanmaa area, I find a sizable, statistically significant increase in 
rehabilitative instruction. Additionally, I find a negative effect on sanctions in Pirkanmaa and Varsinais-Suomi. 
Both of these are channels municipalities may use to optimize their budgets. Overall, decentralization does not 
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Employment is important to the welfare of individuals in many ways: in ad-
dition to being crucial for financial well-being, employment is also linked to
better health outcomes1 and social relationships2. As the benefits of increased
employment are sizeable, ways to get more people employed are highly sought
after: in Finnish public debate, increasing the employment rate is often em-
phasized as one of the most important objectives of public policy. There are
many ways in which the employment rate could be enhanced by policy, such
as the design of unemployment benefit system, social safety net in general,
or active labor market policy. In this thesis, I study how decentralized em-
ployment services affect employment and participation in active labor market
policies. I answer this question by utilizing two Finnish experiments, called
municipal employment trials, where municipalities were given responsibility
to arrange public employment services.
Public employment services (PES) are agencies where the unemployed
register as job seekers and employers register their open vacancies. The
objective of PES is to make the matching process in job search more effective,
i.e. to make job seekers and employers find each other faster and more easily.
Most countries offer these services and they are an important part of job
search for many. (Holzner and Watanabe, 2015).
The most obvious task of PES is to match job seekers to employers, but
often, as in Finland, important tasks for PES include directing job seek-
ers to active labor market policies (ALMP) as well as making employment
and activation plans. Participation in these programs is mandatory for the
job seeker; job seekers who decline to participate lose their unemployment
1see e.g. Ross and Mirowsky (1995)
2see e.g. Pohlan (2019)
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benefits. (TE-palvelut, 2020a). Finnish employment agencies also give a
statement (in Finnish: työvoimapoliittinen lausunto) about every job seeker
to The Finnish Social Insurance Institution (Kela) or the individual’s unem-
ployment fund, indicating whether the individual qualifies for unemployment
benefits (TE-palvelut, 2020b).
The effects of using PES in job search are not that well understood,
but the services are hypothesized to reduce search frictions and lower wages
(Holzner and Watanabe, 2015). Theoretically, the effects of PES have been
analyzed by Pissarides (1979), who built a search model with both registered
vacancies and random search. He finds that when the costs of using random
search are decreased, job matching increases and steady-state unemployment
decreases. When, in turn, the costs of using public employment services
decrease, the effects are ambiguous. Therefore, the conclusion from Pissarides
(1979) is that governments should encourage random search instead of using
public employment services, if faster job finding is the objective.
Empirically, the evidence on the effects of PES is not very conclusive.
Fougère et al. (2009) investigate whether public employment services affect
search outcomes and find that public employment services are beneficial: they
find that exits from unemployment increase when more jobs are contacted
using PES. Regarding the effects on wages, Addison (2002) and Holzer (1988)
find that job offers accepted through PES have lower wages. There is also
evidence to the contrary: Weber and Mahringer (2008) as well as Osberg
(1993) find that using PES has no effects on wages.
The provision of public employment services can be centralized or decen-
tralized. Examples of decentralized employment service regimes are Canada,
Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands (Mosley, 2012). Many other coun-
tries have also experimented with or adopted decentralization in employ-
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ment services, including Germany, Italy and Sweden (Mergele and Weber,
2020). According to Mosley (2012), in some countries with decentralized em-
ployment services the federal government is still very involved in providing
employment services: in Belgium, for example, the central government uses
activation interviews. In Finland, the central government is currently re-
sponsible for employment services. Decentralized employment services have,
however, been experimented twice in Finland: the first trial was conducted
in 2012–2015 and the second in 2017–2018. These two policy experiments
are utilized in this thesis to investigate the effects of decentralized PES.
The basic research question of this thesis is: are decentralized employ-
ment offices better at arranging employment services compared to centralized
employment agencies? This question can be answered especially by looking
at the effects of the second trial, since in that trial the responsibility to
arrange employment services was shifted to municipalities for some job seek-
ers. The results from the first trial, in turn, can be used to assess whether
complimentary municipal employment services have employment effects.
Evidence on the effects of PES decentralization is limited; the most cred-
ible study on this topic is the paper by Mergele and Weber (2020), who
studied the decentralization of job offices in Germany. Other notable pa-
pers include Lundin and Skedinger (2006) and Boockmann et al. (2015), but
they investigate somewhat different programs. Additionally, a short program
duration of only three months is a problem in Lundin and Skedinger (2006).
Although the Finnish municipal employment trials are not completely
similar to the German reform, and the used methods are different3, this
3This thesis uses individual level data, while Mergele and Weber (2020) use job office
level data in their main analyses. While both this thesis and their paper use a difference-
in-differences strategy, the specifications and main outcome variables are different.
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thesis can be thought of as a replication of the research by Mergele and
Weber (2020) in Finnish context: the theoretical background and some of
the outcomes studied here are similar to those in Mergele and Weber (2020).
As Mergele and Weber (2020) was the first credible evidence on the effects of
PES decentralization, this thesis answers an important question, which has
not yet been fully answered: more empirical evidence is needed in order to
make policy recommendations.
In Chapter 2, I present the Finnish institutional background and give
descriptions of the municipal employment trials studied in this thesis. In the
description of the trials, I also discuss the earlier evaluations of these trials.
In Chapter 3, I discuss the theoretical reasons why decentralized employment
services could have advantages over a centralized system or vice versa. The
theory of decentralization is ambiguous about the effects: on one hand the
municipalities know the local conditions and job seekers well and may care
more about placing them in jobs, but on the other hand the objectives of local
authorities may differ drastically from the ones of the central government
(Mergele and Weber, 2020).
In Chapter 4, previous empirical research is reviewed. First, I present the
earlier findings on employment service decentralization and then the empir-
ical research on decentralization in general. After that, I discuss briefly the
empirical literature on active labor market policies, since decentralization of
PES is hypothesized to affect the types of ALMP where job seekers are di-
rected. Chapter 5 describes the data and Chapter 6 introduces the matching
and difference-in-differences methods used in this thesis.
In the empirical section of this thesis I conduct an empirical impact eval-
uation of two Finnish policy experiments: the municipal employment trial of
2012–2015 and the regional employment trial of 2017–2018. These programs
10
were called trials, despite the lack of randomization. Because the municipal-
ities participating in these programs were not chosen at random, selection
bias likely occurs. That is, the municipalities that participated in the tri-
als might be very different from those that did not, which makes evaluation
harder. Additionally, the participants in the treated municipalities (in the
2017–2018 program) were for the most part those who had the worst employ-
ment prospects (i.e. the long-term unemployed). To overcome the selection
bias, I use matching to create more balanced treatment and control groups
and difference-in-differences to calculate the treatment effects.
The trials I study are different from each other: in the first trial, con-
ducted between September 2012 and December 2015, municipalities arranged
complimentary employment services, but the centralized employment office
was still responsible for arranging the basic employment services. In the
second trial, conducted between August 2017 and December 2018, some job
seekers in treated municipalities were transferred from the centralized em-
ployment agencies to the municipality, making it possible to compare out-
comes of the treated individuals to those of matched control individuals.
Because the trials are not similar, different outcomes are expected to be
affected. For instance, ALMP participation is not expected to rise in the first
trial, since direction to ALMP was not a responsibility of municipalities in
the first trial. In the second trial, however, it was, so effects on activation are
expected in the later trial. Because of this, effects on ALMP participation as
a whole and participation in specific services are investigated in the analysis of
the 2017–2018 trial. The results are discussed in relation to ALMP literature
and predictions made based on the incentives of municipalities. Both trials
had an objective of increasing employment. Hence, effects on employment




In Finland, public employment services are organized by the employment of-
fices (TE-palvelut), which are coordinated by ELY centres (Centre for Eco-
nomic Development, Transport and the Environment). There are 15 ELY
centres in Finland and they are responsible for executing the central gov-
ernment’s policies e.g. in areas of transportation, the environment, and em-
ployment4. Ministry of Employment and the Economy (TEM) controls ELY
centres, so at the moment arranging employment services is a responsibility
of the central government.
There are 15 employment agencies in Finland, one in every region. Ac-
cording to the law about public employment services in Finland (FINLEX
916/2012), the tasks of public employment agencies are to help the labor
market work efficiently, promote employment and economic growth, and in-
crease labor supply. According to the law, the employment agencies should
offer job placement services, advising, services to increase human capital as
well as services to help starting a business. Employment agencies are also re-
sponsible for arranging active labor market services and directing job seekers
to these services. (FINLEX, 2012).
Active labor market policies play an important role in Finnish society:
hundreds of millions of euros are spent every year on these policies. Finland
spends more on active labor market policies than most countries: in 2014,
Finland spent 1 percent of its GDP on these services (OECD, 2016). This
results in approximately 4 percent of labor force participating in ALMP
services in Finland (Crépon and van den Berg, 2016). Despite the generous
4TEM (2020). Url: https://tem.fi/ely-keskukset, last accessed: 6 May 2020
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funding for ALMP, the funding for PES is not very high according to OECD
(2016).
Following the lead of Canada, Belgium and others (Mosley, 2012), there
has been discussion in Finland about making the municipalities take re-
sponsibility for arranging employment services. This change is believed by
politicians and officials to both increase the activation rate and enhance the
employment prospects of job seekers. The government even considers the de-
centralization of employment services as a tool to increase the employment
rate. The interest in decentralizing employment services has led the Finnish
government to conduct two large-scale experiments, which are utilized in this
thesis. The details of the trials are discussed in the next subchapters.
2.2 2012–2015 municipal employment trial
In the first trial, conducted between September 2012 and December 2015,
municipalities arranged complimentary employment services, but the respon-
sibility to arrange the regular employment services (e.g. direction to activa-
tion) was still on the employment agencies. The municipalities offered a wide
range of services that supported learning and co-operation with corporations.
61 municipalities participated in the first trial. (Arnkil et al., 2015). The par-
ticipating municipalities are presented in Figure 1 and they are also listed in
the Appendix C. The best cost estimate for the first trial is 30 million euros,
which was the amount of funds granted for the trial (Arnkil et al., 2015).
The official report by Arnkil et al. (2015) did not attempt to analyze the
causal effects of the trial. The effects of the first trial have only been ana-
lyzed by Nieminen et al. (2020). They used municipal-level data and studied
effects of the trial using matching and difference-in-differences. They found
no statistically significant effects on unemployment or activation rates. The
13
treated municipalities were matched to untreated municipalities on propen-
sity score, which was calculated on population, unemployment and number
of people in activation. The matching was performed in the period before
the trial started on a cross-section dataset.
Figure 1: Treated municipalities, 2012-2015 trial
Notes. Treated municipalities are colored. The map is created using open
geodata from Statistics Finland and R packages rgdal and sp.
2.3 2017–2018 regional employment trial
The second program utilized in this thesis is the Regional Employment Trial
(in Finnish: Työvoima- ja yrityspalveluiden alueellinen kokeilu). In this trial,
there were 5 regions where 23 municipalities assumed the responsibility of
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arranging employment services (Annala et al., 2019). The difference to the
2012–2015 trial is that in the later trial there was actually a shift in re-
sponsibility: the municipalities started arranging all employment services to
certain target groups, which can be identified from the data, unlike in the
first trial. The target groups are presented in Table 1. Because of the shift
in responsibility, the later trial is the most interesting of these two trials and
hence will be the in the focus of this thesis. The participating municipalities
are presented in Figure 2 and listed in Appendix C.
Table 1: Target groups by area, 17-18 trial
Area Target group
Varsinais-Suomi Job seekers under 25 and job seekers who
have been unemployed over a year
Pirkanmaa Job seekers on basic unemployment allowance
Pohjois-Savo Unemployed over 12 months and have not been
in activation services during that time
Lappi Unemployed over 12 months
Pori Those under 25 who have been unemployed over
6 months and those over 25 who have been on
labor market allowance for over 200 days
15
Figure 2: Treated municipalities, 2017-2018 trial
Notes. Treated municipalities are colored. The map is created using open
geodata from Statistics Finland and R packages rgdal and sp.
The effects of the 2017–2018 trial have not been analyzed on the individual
level before (except an attempt in Varsinais-Suomi area) and hence this thesis
is the first attempt to quantify these effects rigorously. Previously Arnkil
et al. (2019) have studied the effects of the 2017–2018 regional program in
Pirkanmaa area. They comparied matched control municipalities to treated
Pirkanmaa area municipalities using municipal level data. They did not find
effects on extended unemployment rate (meaning the sum of unemployed and
those in activation services). The analysis, however, had some issues: first,
the matching performed was not successful in creating treatment and control
16
groups that would have had parallel trends in unemployment rate before
treatment. Secondly, they ignored that similar programs were in place in
some municipalities that were used as controls. For example, Turku was used
as a control municipality for Tampere, while Turku was also participating in
its own regional program.
Nieminen et al. (2020) have also studied the program using municipal
level data and a similar approach as Arnkil et al. (2019) used in their evalu-
ation of the Tampere Area trial. They found that the second trial increased
activation ratio significantly, 5 percentage points, but the effect on unem-
ployment was not significant.
The only previous analysis using also individual level data is the report
by Ylikännö et al. (2019). They did both a municipal level analysis as well
as individual level analysis in Varsinais-Suomi area, but the individual level
analysis is somewhat confused: they attempt to do difference-in-differences
analysis using a logit specification, but they do not show pre-trends. Their
finding was that unemployment prevalence was 4 percent higher in the treat-
ment area after the start of treatment. They do not find statistically signifi-




The theoretical framework of this thesis is centered on the notion that while
municipalities can be better at arranging employment services and may care
more about placing job seekers in jobs, there is a trade-off caused by munic-
ipalities having different objectives than the central government: municipal-
ities may e.g. try to shift costs to other levels of the government (Mergele
and Weber, 2020). This is not the only trade-off in decentralization; issues
to consider when assessing the benefits and costs of decentralizing employ-
ment services include the possible externalities or economies of scale (Oates,
1972), competition between areas (Tiebout, 1956), sharing of costs (Besley
and Coate, 2003) as well as accountability (Tommasi and Weinschelbaum,
2007).
Because the Finnish municipal employment trials were similar to the Ger-
man reform studied by Mergele and Weber (2020), the theoretical framework
of this thesis is similar to the one they use. Mergele and Weber (2020) men-
tioned informational advantages as a main mechanism why decentralized
employment offices could be more efficient than centralized offices. They
mentioned lock-in-effect, change in ALMP types, and incentives of local
politicians to change sanctioning policies in the hope of re-election as rea-
sons why decentralization of employment services may have harmful effects.
All of these mechanisms and related literature are discussed in this chapter.
Additionally, I consider increased activation and increased integration of em-
ployment and health services as possible mechanisms affecting outcomes of
participants. The key elements of the theoretical framework are illustrated
in the Figure 3.
18


















shift costs to the
central government







When designing public policies, governments have to decide at which level
of governance (i.e. centralized or decentralized) they want to arrange public
services or to provide public goods. The literature that addresses the ques-
tion about the optimal level of government to provide public services is the
fiscal federalism literature. The fiscal federalism theories can be divided to
earlier and later generations: the earlier literature was mostly focused on
the efficiency gains of decentralization, resulting from different preferences in
different areas. (Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2017).
In the second generation fiscal federalism literature, there are other issues
besides efficiency gains and losses that come into consideration. The newer
fiscal federalism theories focus on the aspects of political economy: politicians
are seen as selfish actors, who have their own objectives. This is in contrast
with the first generation literature, where governments were viewed as well-
minded actors. (Martinez-Vazquez et al., 2017). Weingast (2009) provides a
good review of the second generation fiscal federalism theories.
3.1.1 Local preferences
One reason why municipalities could be better at arranging employment
services is that municipalities can take local conditions and preferences better
into account compared to a centralized employment agency. This argument
about decentralization making it possible to differentiate policies according
to the preferences in different areas was first introduced by Oates (1972), who
studied decentralization in a setting where the central government would offer
the same level of service to all areas, whereas decentralization would make it
possible to provide different services to different areas.
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The key result from Oates (1972) is called the Oates Decentralization
Theorem. The theorem is still one of the most important results in the
theory of decentralization. The Oates Theorem argues that decentralization
is beneficial if different areas have different preferences and there are no
externalities. In addition to these assumptions, the Oates theorem assumes
that the central government would offer the same policy for all areas, meaning
that the central government could not differentiate the services by area.
As was later argued in Oates (1999), the uniform provision assumption
can be realistic, since decentralized governments have informational advan-
tages: they know the residents in their area better than the central govern-
ment, which makes them able to take the heterogeneous preferences into ac-
count. According to Besley and Coate (2003), the assumption about uniform
provision in the centralized regime is, however, not very realistic: they argue
that there are no theoretical or empirical reasons why the central government
would not differentiate the policies by area. Also, the Oates Decentralization
Theorem is only valid when there are no economies of scale in the produc-
tion of the service: if there were, the centralized provision of the service could
be preferred despite the welfare loss from not providing different outputs to
different areas (Oates, 1972).
Oates (1972) argues that the central government should arrange public
services that are likely to have big interjurisdictional externalities. Employ-
ment services are not likely to be this type of services, and therefore the
Oates theorem suggests decentralized PES should be better than centralized
PES. Additionally, Oates (1972) suggests that the optimal level of provision
depends on how different the preferences are in different areas and how ho-
mogenous the areas are inside: if the districts are very different from each
other and homogenous inside, decentralization is better. When it comes to
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Finnish municipalities, the differences between large cities and rural Finland
are big in terms of education level, population and age distribution5. Using
Oates (1972), this would mean that decentralization in employment services
could be beneficial.
3.1.2 Mobility of job seekers
Tiebout (1956) introduces an argument that individuals can move to an
area where the provision of local public goods is what the individual wishes.
This results in competition between districts. If employment services were
decentralized, a job seeker could move to a municipality which has the best
suited employment services for that individual, which would lead to greater
social welfare. In case of employment services, the users of the service are
unemployed, which may weaken the Tiebout’s argument; the unemployed
may not be willing to move to another municipality even if the services there
were better.
Mobility of job seekers is related to the question of employment service
decentralization also in other ways. Labour mobility is an outcome where
the municipality may have different objectives than the central government:
municipalities may want the job seekers to try finding a job in the local
area, even if it means that the job search may take a longer time. The
central government, however, could prefer that the job seeker finds a job
faster, maybe in another area with shortages of labour. This mechanism
is called lock-in-effect in the literature and it is mentioned as one of the
possible disadvantages of employment service decentralization by Mergele
5For example, Helsinki has over 600 000 inhabitants while the median Finnish munici-
pality has 6080 inhabitants (Kuntaliitto, 2019). In some municipalities over 40 percent of
individuals are older than 65 years old, whereas in some other municipalities that share is
much smaller (Yle, 2015).
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and Weber (2020) and Lundin and Skedinger (2006). The lock-in-effect is
usually thought to occur because getting job seekers employed in the same
municipality increases the tax revenue of that municipality (Mergele and
Weber, 2020).
Besides increasing the local tex revenue, municipalities may also have
other reasons to prefer employment in their area. In Finland, especially young
people move out of rural areas, which is good for the overall employment rate,
but at the same time it is very bad for the municipalities with declining and
aging populations. Therefore, the municipalities have incentives to try to
stop this trend. Indeed, some municipalities have even offered money for
young people to choose to go to school there or to move there: for example,
in the municipality of Simo, high school students get free books and a laptop6.
If municipalities want to decrease mobility, giving them a responsibility to
arrange employment services could give them that possibility. This could
then lead to worse job finding prospects for job seekers.
3.1.3 Political economy
Besley and Coate (2003) investigate theoretically whether provision of local
public goods should be centralized or decentralized using political economy
approach. They find that decentralization can be benefial even if the central-
ized regime could offer different services to different areas. Their approach,
therefore, does not assume that the centralized regime would provide the
same services in all areas – an assumption made in Oates (1972). Besley and
Coate (2003) find that the effects of decentralization depend on spillovers
and preferences of the citizens: with high spillovers, centralization can be
better despite the political economy concerns. Their conclusion is similar
6Source: https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-11158844
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to Oates (1972), but there is a difference: when in the earlier literature the
main reason to decentralize was the assumption that the central government
would offer same service in all areas, in Besley and Coate (2003) the main
disadvantage of a centralized system is the conflict of interests between dis-
tricts, when all costs are shared. Local politicians could make others pay for
their spending.
While the conflicts of interest between areas in Besley and Coate (2003)
arise in a centralized system with shared costs, it can be argued that local
politicians may try to do similar cost-shifting in a decentralized system, espe-
cially in the case of employment service decentralization: Mergele and Weber
(2020) argue based on Besley and Coate (2003) and Weingast et al. (1981)
that decentralized employment offices may try to shift costs to the central
government e.g. by changing ALMP types. This would lead to conflict of
interest between the central government and the local governments: while
the central government may want to mimimize the costs to the society as a
whole, the local government may just want to minimize the costs they have
to pay, not caring what costs have to be paid in the other levels of govern-
ment. There is evidence that extensive cost-shifting often happens in welfare
states with multiple levels of governance: Bonoli and Trein (2016) find that
cost-shifting in social programs was rampant in both countries, Switzerland
and Germany, that they studied.
Thus, if the possibility to shift cost to other levels of government was
presented, it is likely that the municipalities would take advantage of it.
For instance, if employment services were decentralized, municipalities could
try to change the services such that costs for the municipality would be
minimized. As was pointed out by Mergele and Weber (2020), this could
mean e.g. changes in ALMP types or in sanctioning policies. Incentives of
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municipalities regarding ALMP types and sanctioning, in Finnish context,
are discussed more in detail in the subchapters 3.3 and 3.4.
3.2 Principal-agent problem
Decentralization can also be thought in the principal-agent framework. There
are reasons to believe municipalities are more informed about the local con-
ditions, job market, and job seekers compared to the centralized employment
agencies. This would naturally make them better at arranging employment
services. The issue is, however, that municipalities may have different objec-
tives than the central government, i.e. they may be more interested in the
development of the local economy as opposed to the national economy. This
situation is similar to the principal-agent problem7, where in this case the
central government is the principal and the municipality is the agent.
There have been attempts to compare decentralized and centralized pro-
vision of public goods using the principal-agent framework. It is, however,
used to study a different trade-off than the one described above: Tommasi
and Weinschelbaum (2007) use it to answer whether better accountability in
a decentralized system makes decentralization desirable even in the presence
of externalities. The idea behind their analysis is that decentralization may
increase accountability by reducing problems citizens have in controlling the
government, called control problems. They build a common agency model
where there are M number of cities, and in all of them a local public good
(or a policy) should be produced. In the model there are M goods denoted
by x = (x1, x2, ..., xM) and N = n1 + n2 + ...+ nM citizens. Each citizen has
a type and the citizen of type i gets utility of bii from their own public good
and externality of bij from other public goods. The citizens are considered
7see Sappington (1991)
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to be principals and cities are considered to be agents in the model. In the
model, a centralized regime is one where only one agent (a city) is hired and
the decentralized system is one where many cities are hired.
Tommasi and Weinschelbaum (2007) analyze decentralization by compar-
ing the efforts of the agents (cities) in three settings: the first best, the tradi-
tional second best problem and the harder agency problem with more prin-
cipals. In the first-best case, the centralized provision is preferred: Tommasi
and Weinschelbaum (2007) derive that too little effort (less than optimum)
is produced as a result of decentralization, whereas in the centralized case
the produced effort is at the optimum. In the second-best principal-agent
case, which they call the traditional principal agent probelm, however, they
find that the effort at the centralized regime is not at the optimum either. In
the decentralized case, the effort is still smaller than in the centralized case,
unless the externalities in consumption are zero.
When Tommasi and Weinschelbaum (2007) consider a harder agency
problem with larger number of principals, the effort under the centralized
regime is smaller than when there was just one principal. In this case, the
effort is lowered by what they call too many principals effect. This means
that having more principals makes the effort of centralized agents lower. In
the decentralized case with many principals there is also the effect of many
principals, but it is not as strong compared to the cenralized case. However,
with decentralization there is the effect of externalities, which means that in
order to compare the two regimes, the externality effect has to be compared
to the difference in the many principal effects. By comparing these, Tommasi
and Weinschelbaum (2007) get two results: 1) the trivial one, that decentral-
ization is better if there are no externalities and 2) that for a fixed parameter
δ, which measures control problems, there always exists a level of external-
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ities, such that decentralization is preferable. This result by Tommasi and
Weinschelbaum (2007) implies that decentralization can be preferred even if
the preferences are homogeneous in cities, which means that the heterogene-
ity of preferences needed by the Oates Theorem is not needed to argue for
decentralization in the model.
3.3 Incentives of municipalities
Mergele and Weber (2020) argue that local job offices may want to give less
benefit sanctions in order to increase local politicians’ re-election probabili-
ties. This mechanism could be valid also in Finland, since municipal councils
have elected politicians and they can probably influence how employment
offices are run in the municipality. As Mergele and Weber (2020) noted,
in the local level politicians influencing employment offices is much more a
plausible scenario than it would be in the central government level.
There is also a reason specific to Finland why municipalities may want
to give less sanctions. The Finnish system is organized in such a way that
municipalities bear some costs of social benefits: for instance, municipalities
pay 50 percent of costs in housing allowance and social assistance. This has
effects on the incentives of municipalities, if they are in charge of employment
services: if municipalities give less unemployment benefit sanctions to job
seekers, they may have to pay less social assistance or housing allowance. In
the empirical section, I study whether municipalities acted according to these
incentives (i.e. reduced sanctions) or not. Analyzing the effect of sanctions
is similar to Mergele and Weber (2020) who also looked at the effects of
employment service decentralization on sanctions.
If the municipalities reduced sanctions, decentralization could increase
unemployment, since giving less sanctions could make people less eager to
27
seek work: sanctions are found to increase employment (Mergele and We-
ber, 2020). This would, however, depend on the actual employment effects
of sanctions: if the municipalities were less strict in sanctioning without it
affecting employment, this could even be seen as welfare improvement. This
is because if it is possible to achieve the same (or higher) employment with
less sanctions, giving less sanctions improves the welfare of those who were
sanctioned without harming the welfare of others. This could be a possible
scenario too, since there is evidence that benefit sanctions reduce the quality
of employment: according to Arni et al. (2012), the effect of sanctions on
employment durations and wages is negative.
Mergele and Weber (2020) consider ALMP types as a channel for local
job offices to shift costs to the central government. In Finland, at least
one channel of this kind exists: the rehabilitative work programs (in Finnish:
kuntouttava työtoiminta). In Finland, municipalities have to pay a fine to the
central government for every long-term unemployed person8. If, however, the
person participates in a rehabilitative work program, the municipality does
not have to pay the fine. Therefore, municipalities have clear incentives to
increase the number of individuals in rehabilitative work programs. This can
then lead to a sizeable increase in the costs the central government has to
pay and may also lead to worse job-finding prospects for the unemployed, if
these programs are less effective than other programs.
3.4 Activation services
One key mechanism through which decentralization of employment services
could affect employment is via the activation services. Compared to cen-
tralized employment offices, municipalities could either direct job seekers to
8See, for example https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-9236853
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different types of services than the centralized offices would or direct more
job seekers to activation than the centralized offices would. In the empirical
section, both of this mechanisms are studied. To see whether municipalities
directed more job seekers to activation, I investigate the effects on the prob-
ability of participating in activation; to see whether municipalities changed
the types of activation, I look at the effects of the trial on probabilities of
participation in different types of activation policies.
Mergele and Weber (2020) mentioned different ALMP types as possible
ways the local job offices can shift costs to the central government. As men-
tioned in the subchapter 3.3, in Finland the municipalities benefit financially
from directing job seekers to rehabilitative work programs. Those programs
are meant to be for individuals in need of rehabilitation, so any substantial
increases in them indicate that municipalities are not acting in the best inter-
ests of job seekers or the central government, but instead are just optimizing
the municipal expenses. Because of this, special weight should be given to
the effects of the trials on the participation in rehabilitative work programs.
The activation services that municipalities offer can also be more inte-
grated to other services: in the first trial, one key objective was to offer
integrated health and employment services (Arnkil et al., 2015). If the inte-
gration with health services or the increased activation in general improve the
labor market prospects of individuals, decentralization should result in bet-
ter employment outcomes for participants in the long term. If employment
increased through this mechanism, we would not expect to see the effects
in a very short time period, because research has shown that if the ALMPs
have positive effects, they are not immediate (Card et al., 2018). Because of





The theory of fiscal federalism is ambiguous about the effects of decentral-
ization of employment services, predicting there may be both adverse effects,
such as cost shifting, but also favorable effects such as increased employment
due to municipalities knowing the local conditions better. Therefore, empiri-
cal evidence is needed to address the magnitude of both of these mechanisms.
The best way to address this question empirically would be by utilizing nat-
ural experiments, where countries change their employment service regimes.
Finding credible evidence would, however, require variation in the degree of
centralization within a country, similarly to the German reform in Mergele
and Weber (2020) or the municipal employment trials studied in this thesis.
Decentralization of employment services has not been studied very exten-
sively in the empirical fiscal federalism literature compared to other things,
such as education, public finance or the environment (Mergele and Weber,
2020). Relevant studies include Mergele and Weber (2020), Lundin and
Skedinger (2006) and Boockmann et al. (2015). One reason for the lack of
empirical studies concerning decentralization of employment services is prob-
ably the lack of reforms that would have allowed the study of causal effects
ot the reform: in such reforms, some areas would need to stay centralized, in
order to provide a counterfactual for the decentralized areas.
The most credible empirical evidence on the effects of employment service
decentralization is shown by Mergele and Weber (2020) who studied the Ger-
man decentralization of job centers using job center level data. The reform
they utilized left some job centers centralized while some were decentral-
ized permanently. They compare job finding in decentralized areas to that
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in centralized areas using a difference-in-differences model with the stock of
jobs and stock of job seekers as controls. The specification was derived from
Cobb-Douglas form stock-flow matching function. Their analysis indicates
negative employment effects: they find a decrease of 0.34 percentage points
in job-finding.
Another mechanism Mergele and Weber (2020) study is whether the de-
centralization of job centers changed the types of activation measures where
job seekers were directed. They find that job centers increased direction to
job creation schemes by 0.29 percentage points. They interpret this as ev-
idence suggesting that local governments exploited the system in order to
shift costs to the central government.
Mergele and Weber (2020) also investigate whether the reform caused a
lock-in-effect. This is done by estimating the elasticity of the flows to em-
ployment with respect to the vacancies in neighbouring areas. They found
no lock-in-effect, and hence conclude that the negative effect on job-finding
is not because of decreased labor mobility, but is due to general inefficiency
of decentralized employment offices. The results from Mergele and Weber
(2020) are very unfavourable to employment service decentralization: they
find that decentralized offices are both worse at placing job seekers and are
used by local governments to shift local costs to the national budget. Al-
though they do not find a lock-in effect, the results are not very promising.
Lundin and Skedinger (2006) utilize a Swedish program that gave mu-
nicipalities more responsibility in active labor policies. The Swedish pilot
programme Lundin and Skedinger (2006) study is somewhat similar to the
first Finnish municipal employment trial (2012-2015), so the study by Lundin
and Skedinger (2006) is very relevant especially to the first trial. Similarly
to Mergele and Weber (2020), Lundin and Skedinger (2006) do not find a
31
lock-in-effect, but do find support to the cost-shifting concern: they have ev-
idence that suggests municipalities tried to enhance their budgets in expense
of the central government. They do not make claims about the employment
effects of the program. The duration of the program short; it may have been,
according to them, too short for the effects (e.g. the lock-in-effect) to appear.
Because the evidence on employment service decentralization is scarce,
it is useful to look at studies that estimate the effects of decentralization in
other areas. This can be especially useful when looking at services similar or
linked to employment services, such as welfare administration. Boockmann
et al. (2015) study the German welfare reform of 2005, where welfare admin-
istration was decentralized. Boockmann et al. (2015) find that the decentral-
ization had negative employment effects for males. For females there was no
effect. In services that are different from employment services, such as edu-
cation, more positive effects have been found: Ahlin and Mörk (2008) study
the Swedish school decentralization and find that more decentralized school
regimes employ more teachers, meaning that they have a higher teacher-
pupil ratio. Hence, decentralization increased the quality of the service in
education.
In addition to possible employment effects, decentralization may have
other effects: since especially the newer fiscal federalism theory emphasizes
the political economy side of decentralization, empirical research on outcomes
such as corruption is very central in order to understand decentralization.
Fan et al. (2009) and Faguet (2004) study this mechanism empirically: Fan
et al. (2009) find that there is more corruption in areas with large number
of local public employees. This suggests that decentralization may not be
desirable, if it means having more people employed by the local authority.
Faguet (2004) studies decentralization in Bolivia and finds evidence against
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the corruption argument by Fan et al. (2009): to the contrary, decentralized
areas seem to be more efficient than centralized ones, and the effect is more
pronounced in poor areas.
Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) test empirically a theory that the
optimal level of decentralization depends on the level of political decentral-
ization in a country. They use data from 75 countries and find that stronger
political parties make decentralization more beneficial. Additionally, they
find that appointing local politicians instead of using elections does not im-
prove the outcomes of decentralization.
In light of the empirical evidence by Mergele and Weber (2020), Lundin
and Skedinger (2006) and Boockmann et al. (2015) as well as the previous
evaluations of the Finnish municipal employment trials, it can be said that
the previous empirical research does not support the view that employment
service decentralization would increase employment: none of the studies have
found significant increases in employment. Whether the effect is negative or
zero, however, is not clear. Since the number of studies in this topic is
very limited, and only Mergele and Weber (2020) is based on a setting that
allows credible causal interpretations of the effects, more empirical research
is needed in order to learn about the effects of PES decentralization.
4.2 Active labor market policy
Active labor market policy – the effectiveness of it as well as the types of
services job seekers are directed by decentralized offices – is a key mechanism
determining the success of PES decentralization. Active labor market pol-
icy is a topic that has been studied extensively, historically mainly by non-
experimental studies but nowadays more and more randomized controlled
trials are conducted in the topic (Card et al., 2018).
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In the active labor market policy literature, policies are usually classified
into the following categories: training, job search assistance, public sector
employment and private sector incentives (Kluve, 2016). According to Kluve
(2010) and (Kluve, 2016), public employment programs do not increase em-
ployment whereas incentives and wage subsidies have more positive effects.
A summary of benefits and costs of different ALMP types by (Kluve, 2016)
is presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Effectiveness of ALMP: Summary by Kluve (2016, 6.)
Job search
assistance
Training Private incentives Public employment
Cost Low Medium High High
Short term effect + – + +





Displacement medium low high high
According to Crépon and van den Berg (2016), the evidence suggests that
active labor market programmes do not have very big effects on employ-
ment probabilities: while effects may be positive, the gain from increased
employment might be smaller than the costs. It is hard to know, since many
evaluations just look at the effect on employment but do not conduct a cost-
benefit analysis (Crépon and van den Berg, 2016).
Numerous other meta analyses have also been conducted on the topic.
Card et al. (2010) use 199 programs in their analysis and find that public
employment programs are less effective than job search assistance or training
programs. They find that the long term impacts are usually better than the
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short term impacts: even programs with negative first-year results, the long
term results look usually positive. They also find that different outcome
variables give different results. Card et al. (2018) find in their meta-analysis
that program impacts are close to zero in the short term and positive in the
long term, i.e. 2 to 3 years after the program. Different kinds of programs
have different impacts.
Even if active labor market policies had positive effects on the employ-
ment of those who participated, they may not have net effects on employment
rate. This is because labor market programs may affect the economy as a
whole, generating general equilibrium effects. This means that the program
affects also the economic environment, not only outcomes of the program
participants (Crépon and van den Berg, 2016). Regarding equilibrium ef-
fects, active labor market policies have been found to have large displace-
ment effects by Crepon et al. (2013). They used a French double randomized
controlled trial (RCT) with different treatment intensities to evaluate both
the effect on participants and the displacement effect. They found that the
programs had displacement effects resulting in no net gain in employment.
As can be seen from Table 2, which is from Kluve (2016), public employ-
ment creation programs have been found to be both ineffective and costly.
Similar results are found also in Kluve (2010) and Card et al. (2010). Hence,
if the decentralization increases this type of programs (e.g. rehabilitative
work programs), the employment effects may be negative in light of the em-




I use individual level datasets from Statistics Finland (FOLK modules) and
The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (TEM modules). The
datasets used in this research are:
• FOLK perustieto: basic information about individuals living in Fin-
land, 1987-2018
• FOLK jaksotieto (työttömyys, sijoitus, työsuhde): unemployment peri-
ods, work placement periods, employment periods, 1991-2017
• FOLK jaksotieto (työvoimakoulutus): training periods, 2005-2017
• TEM Työnhaku: unemployment and activation periods, 1991-2018
• TEM Työnhakija: information about unemployed jobseekers, 1991-
2018.
The FOLK perustieto module contains annual information about all people
living in Finland. The FOLK jaksotieto modules contain all unemployment
periods, activation periods as well as the employment status in the last week
of every year. TEM datasets include monthly information about job seekers
and their unemployment periods and activation periods. Not all types of
activation periods are available in the FOLK activation periods, so data from
TEM Työnhaku module is also used when determining which individuals are
participating in activation in monthly basis.
The TEM modules contain information about job seekers and their unem-
ployment and activation periods. Additionally, the important piece of infor-
mation of who participated in the later trial is found in the TEM Työnhakija
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module: the module contains the code of the employment office where a job
seeker is registered at, allowing me to identify the participants. This is be-
cause all five trial areas had their own trial code and the office codes for
the participants were changed to these trial area codes. The TEM datasets
have all data in the form of spells: they have start and end dates for e.g.
unemployment periods, activation periods as well as the employment office
code. Because the data is in the form of spells, it could be transformed to
monthly or even daily data. I use bimonthly data (i.e. data points every two
months) in the analysis of the 2017–2018 trial and yearly data in the analysis
of the 2012–2015 trial.
The unemployment register data is not very clean: there are e.g. unem-
ployment periods without the exit date despite the fact that there is a later
unemployment spell with an exit date. This means that there may be two
unemployment spells for the same individual, beginning in the same date,
but only one of them has the exit date. The data is full of duplicates, so I
clean the data by deleting unemployment spells that overlap, meaning that
they have the same start or end date. Because some of the spells are correct
and some clearly are not, the procedure I use to clean the unemployment
spell data is the following:
• I delete job seekers who are not unemployed, but are laid off.
• I delete complete duplicates (same individual, same start and end
dates).
• I delete spells with the same individual and start date, which don’t
have an end date (keeping the one with an end date). If there is no
half-duplicate with an end date, the one without is kept.
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• I delete spells where the end date is missing but the unemployment
spell is not the last one for the individual.
• For a given end date, I keep only the spell with latest start date.
• For a given start date, I keep only the spell with the first end date.
Similar procedure is done with the activation period data, but the activation
data is much cleaner than the unemployment period data, meaning that
there are not many duplicates. Using the unemployment periods, I construct
a dummy variable indicating whether a person is unemployed in a particular
month. A person is considered to be unemployed in a particular month if they
are unemployed in the last day of that month. I define being in activation
similarly: those who are in activation services in the last day of a month are
considered to be in activation in that month.
In the analysis of the 2012–2015 trial, I use yearly data. In the analysis,
yearly employment and unemployment statuses are from the last month of
every year. For the analysis of the 2017–2018 trial, in turn, I construct a
dataset that has unemployment, activation, sanction and treatment statuses
bimonthly (every two months) for years 2016–2018 and yearly covariates from
the FOLK modules. I do the propensity score matching in a cross section
dataset, obtained from this dataset by keeping only the data from July 2017.
5.2 Treatment and control groups
Treatment and control groups are defined differently in the evaluations of
2012–2015 and 2017–2018 trials. In the 2012–2015 trial the participants can-
not be identified, so the unit of the analysis is the municipality: I investigate
the municipal level effects using individual level data. The results can then
be compared to Nieminen et al. (2020) who analyzed the trial using municipal
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level data. Nieminen et al. (2020) created treatment and control groups by
matching treated municipalities to non-treated municipalities. In the anal-
ysis of the first trial, I use the same treated and control municipalities that
were used by Nieminen et al. (2020). These are listed in the Appendix C.
In the 2017–2018 trial, however, participants can be identified, which
makes it possible to create individual level treatment and control groups and
investigate how their outcomes changed compared to similar individuals who
did not participate. The treatment and control groups are created using
propensity score matching. The matching is conducted in the month before
the start of the trial; the method is described in the chapter 6.2. Additionally,
I do specific restrictions to treatment and control groups before the matching
procedure in order to achieve more similar groups. These are described here.
In Varsinais-Suomi, I utilize the 25-year-threshold in treatment assign-
ment in two ways. First, I compare under 25-year-old job seekers in Varsinais-
Suomi to under 25-year-old job seekers in other areas. Individuals who are
treated in other areas are excluded from the control group. I consider these
my main results in Varsinais-Suomi. In addition to those main results, I do
an analysis inside Varsinais-Suomi: I then use all individuals in Varsinais-
Suomi who were born in 1993 as a treatment group, and all individuals in
Varsinais-Suomi who were born in 1991 as a control group. No matching is
conducted in the second analysis.
In Pirkanmaa area, I compare participants in Pirkanmaa to matched con-
trols elsewhere. I delete observations who are on income-dependent unem-
ployment assistance, because all participants in Pirkanmaa area receive either
basic unemployment allowance or labor market subsidy. I could alternatively
have matched on that variable, but deleting the observations in this group
gets rid of the issue more surely. Since the participation rate in Pirkanmaa
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area was over 60 percent and the treated and non-treated groups were very
different, there is no possibility to do the analysis inside the area: even when
trying to match on pre-treatment outcomes and dropping over 50 percent of
observations in matching, the trends are not similar when the analysis is done
inside Pirkanmaa area, i.e. the Pirkanmaa area participants are compared to
Pirkanmaa area non-participants. Therefore, the control individuals have to
be found from other areas.
In Pori, I compare job seekers under the of 25 in Pori to non-treated job
seekers under the of 25 in other areas. The treated groups in Pori were those
under 25 who who had been unemployed for over 6 months. Other groups
were treated too, but restricting the treatment group to the job seekers under
the age of 25 makes it easier to find a similar control group. In Lappi and
Pohjois-Savo, I compare the participants to matched control individuals. I




In order to evaluate the effectiveness of decentralized employment services,
the causal effects of the municipal employment trials on the treated individ-
uals need to be identified. This is called the average treatment effect on the
treated (ATT) and using potential outcomes9, it can be expressed as follows:
ATT = E(Y1i|Di = 1)− E(Y0i|Di = 1) (6.1)
In the equation 6.1, Y1i is the outcome if treatment is received and Y0i is the
outcome when treatment is not received. Clearly, the term E(Y0i|Di = 1) in
the formula for ATT is not observed, since the outcome Y0i is not observed for
those who participate in the trial. If the means of the treated were compared
to the non-treated ignoring the possibility of selection, it would yield:
E(Y1i|Di = 1)− E(Y0i|Di = 0)
= [E(Y1i|Di = 1)− E(Y0i|Di = 1)] + [E(Y0i|Y = 1)− E(Y0i|Di = 0)]
(6.2)
In the equation 6.2, in addition to ATT, the estimate would contain the term
in the latter brackets, which is the selection bias. If there exist variables X
such that if conditioned on X it holds that E(Y0|Y = 1) = E(Y0|Y = 0),
then the problem of selection bias has been overcome. This condition is
called the conditional independence assumption: it means that if variables
X are fixed, the groups are similar. If such variables were available, matching
alone (or controlling for X in a regression) would be sufficient to tackle the
selection problem (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). As no such variables are
available, I use a combined matching and difference-in-differences method10.
9see Angrist and Pischke (2009)
10Matching is only used in the analysis of the second trial (2017–2018).
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Because the matching alone may not get rid of the selection bias, I use it only
to create treatment and control groups that would satisfy the parallel trends
assumption. This assumption means that the trends of treatment and control
groups would be similar in the absence of treatment. Following the notation
of Mummolo (2017), the parallel trends assumption can be expressed as
E[Y0i(1)− Y0i(0)|Di = 1] = E[Y0i(1)− Y0i(0)|Di = 0] (6.3)
The assumption in (6.3) implies that
E[Y0i(1)|Di = 0] = E[Y0i(1)|Di = 1]− E[Y0i(0)|Di = 1] + E[Y0i(0)|Di = 0]
(6.4)
When (6.4) holds we see that the difference in the differences identifies the
average treatment effect on the treated by the following:
DiD = {E(Yi(1)|Di = 1)− E(Yi(1)|Di = 0)}−
{E(Yi(0)|Di = 1)− E(Y (0)|Di = 0)}
= {E(Y1i(1)|Di = 1)− E(Y0i(1)|Di = 0)}−
{E(Y0i(0)|Di = 1)− E(Y0i(0)|Di = 0)}
= [E(Y1i(1)|Di = 1)− (E[Y0i(1)|Di = 1]
−E[Y0i(0)|Di = 1] + E[Y0i(0)|Di = 0])]
−[E(Y0i(0)|Di = 1)− E(Y0i(0)|Di = 0)]
= E[Y1i(1)− Y0i(1)|Di = 1]
(6.5)
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6.2 Propensity score matching
Propensity score matching (PSM) is a widely used method in active labor
market policy evaluations (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). In PSM, partic-
ipants are matched to non-participants using propensity scores, which are
calculated using a logit model
log
P (T = 1)
1− P (T = 1)
= X ′β + εit (6.6)
where covariates X ′ are variables that are thought to affect both treatment
assignment and the outcome variable. After the calculation of propensity
scores, individuals with similar propensity scores are matched to each other
using nearest-neighbour matching or other matching technique. As propen-
sity scores can be thought of as probabilities of being assigned to treatment,
propensity score matching creates treatment and control groups with similar
probabilities of treatment.
A central assumption in propensity score matching is the assumption of
common support. Observations are in the area of common support if it is
not completely determined by the covariates to which group (treatment or
control) they belong. In other words, common support assumption means
that there groups need to have overlap in their distributions of covariates used
in matching. The assumption can be expressed as (Caliendo and Kopeinig,
2008):
0 < P (T = 1|X) < 1 (6.7)
Matching is often used together with difference-in-differences strategy when
the parallel trends assumption is not satisfied (Chabé-Ferret, 2017). In the
2017–2018 municipal employment trial, the treated and non-treated individ-
uals were very different in both background characteristics as well as in un-
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employment trends, which makes matching necessary in order to get similar
trends before the treatment.
The selection of variables in matching is a difficult task, because it may
impact the results. Matching can be done using pre-treatment values of
the outcome variable or alternatively by using only confounding variables.
Chabé-Ferret (2017) argue that pre-treatment outcomes should not be used
in matching, and that matching on pre-treatment outcomes combined with
difference-in-differences is a problematic strategy. According to Chabé-Ferret
(2017) matching on pre-treatment outcomes may increase the bias of the
difference-in-differences estimator.
Traditional argument in favor of matching on pre-treatment outcomes is
the existence of an Ashenfelter dip, a drop in employment or earning before
entering an active labor market program, found by Ashenfelter and Card
(1985). Conditioniong on pre-treatment outcomes, it is possible to create
treatment and control groups with parallel Ashenfelter dips. Additionally,
matching on pre-treatment outcomes combined with difference-in-difference
strategy gives similar results to RCTs, especially in the context of training
programs. (Chabé-Ferret, 2017).
Propensity score matching may, however, increase imbalance according to
King and Nielsen (2019). According to them, the problem with PSM arises
from the fact that PSM tries to approximate a randomized trial. This creates
what they call the PSM paradox. It means that the more balanced the data,
the larger the biases caused by PSM. In light of their evidence, King and
Nielsen (2019) argue that other matching methods, such as coarsened exact
matching, should be used instead of PSM. Since PSM is only used to create
the treatment and control groups, and difference-in-differences strategy is
44
used to estimate the effects, the problems with PSM may not be a big threat
to the validity of the research design in this thesis.
The variables I use in matching vary by treatment area, since all areas
had different type of criteria when they selected participants. Below are the
variables used in matching in different areas. The full balance tables after
the matching procedure are presented in Appendix A.
The variables used in matching in Lappi area include: 1) the length of
unemployment spell in July 2017, 2) the number of unemployment months in
the last 12 months in July 2017, 3) unemployed for less than a year (not long-
term unemployed), 4) education (levels 1–5), 5) indicator whether individual
has participated in activation in the one-year period before the trial, 6) age
and 7) gender.
In Varsinais-Suomi area the variables used in matching include: 1) the
length of unemployment spell in July 2017, 2) basic level of education (cate-
gories 1–5), 3) indicator whether individual has participated in activation in
the one-year period before the trial, 4) age, 5) gender, 6) living in an urban
area, 7) size of family and 8) marital status (levels 1–4).
In Pirkanmaa area the variables used in matching include: 1) the length
of unemployment spell in July 2017, 2) number of unemployment months in
the last 12 months in July 2017 3) gender, 4) living in an urban area, 3)
employed at the end of 2016, 4) employed at the end of 2015, 5) marital
status (levels 1–4), 6) age, 7) size of family
In Pori area the variables used in matching include: 1) the length of
unemployment spell in July 2017, 2) the number of unemployment months
in the last 12 months in July 2017, 3) basic level of education (categories
1–5), 4) living in an urban area, 5) number of years employed during 2011–
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2016 (levels 0–6), 6) employed in 2016, 7) employed in 2015, 8) age and 9)
gender.
In Pohjois-Savo area the variables used in matching include: 1) the
length of unemployment spell in July 2017, 2) unemployed for less than a
year (not long-term unemployed), 3) basic level of education (categories 1-5),
4) indicator whether individual has participated in activation in the one-year
period before the tria, 4) age, 5) gender, 6) living in an urban area, 7) size
of family and 8) marital status.
6.3 Difference-in-differences
Difference-in-differences (DiD) is a popular quasi-experimental research de-
sign that allows the identification of causal effects if the parallel trends as-
sumption holds. This assumption means that, in the absence of treatment,
the trends of treatment and control groups would stay similar. If the paral-
lel trends assumption holds, the difference-in-differences estimator identifies
the average causal effect of treatment on individuals in the treatment group
(ATT). In subchapter 6.1, I showed how the DiD-estimator identifies this
effect.
The parallel trends assumption is untestable, but it can be evaluated by
looking at the trends before treatment: if the pre-trends are parallel, it can
be assumed that the trends would have continued to be similar in the absence
of treatment. The pre-trends are parallel, if the treatment effects before the
start of treatment are zero. In my analysis, I calculate periodic treatment
effects and plot the coefficients. In addition to testing coefficients separately,
the coefficients have to be tested simultaneously to see if the the hypothesis
about all pre-treatment coefficients being zero is rejected or not.
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The difference-in-differences identification strategy has also other assup-
tions: first, the treatment should not affect the control group. Additionally,
no other reforms or interventions should have been implemented during the
intervention that is studied. This assumption is satisfied, except for Pirkan-
maa, where interviews for the unemployed were conducted just before the
start of trial. This intervention caused sudden ends to unemployment spells
in Pirkanmaa area, as the job seekers were directed to services. This makes
it questionable whether the parallel trends assumption holds in the case of
Pirkanmaa.
6.4 Estimated models
I use a difference-in-differences approach and calculate periodic treatment
effects. In the first trial, I calculate yearly treatment effects and in the
second trial the treatment effects are calculated bimonthly (i.e. every two
months). I estimate the periodic difference-in-difference estimates using two-
way fixed effects models with time and unit fixed effects. Depending on the
specification, the unit fixed effect can be either municipality or individual
fixed effect. Generally written, the model used in the empirical section is





it + εit (6.8)
where coefficients θk are the periodic treatment effects, γi is the unit (mu-
nicipality or individual) fixed effect and λt is the time fixed effect. Variables
Dkit are interactions between the treatment and time variable, meaning that
they equal 1 if individual i is treated and t = k. The treatment indicator
for time period −1 is omitted, since the difference between treatment and
control group in other periods is compared to the difference in the period −1.
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The outcome variable Yit is a dummy variable indicating e.g. unemployment,
employment or sanctions.
I start the empirical section by analyzing the 2012–2015 trial, which will
have a lesser focus in this thesis. In the analysis of the first trial, I calculate
yearly treatment effects on the probability of employment and probability
of unemployment. I estimate the model first with municipality fixed effects
and then with individual fixed effects instead. Specifications with different
controls are estimated in both cases. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipal level in all specifications. The outcome variable Yit is a dummy
variable indicating unemployment or employment at the end of year t. The
model used in the analysis can be written






′β + εit (6.9)
where X ′ are the control variables. The years used in the analysis of the first
trial are 2005 – 2016, as can be seen from the model equation (6.9).
After analyzing the 2012-2015 trial I move to the second trial, where I fo-
cus more on the effects on individual outcomes, since the treated individuals
can be identified. In the analysis of the 2017–2018 trial I create treatment
and control groups separately for all trial areas using the matching proce-
dure described in previous sections. I then calculate the treatment effects
separately for all 5 trial areas (Varsinais-Suomi, Pirkanmaa, Pohjois-Savo,
Lappi and Pori). I calculate the effects bimonthly (observations every two
months) due to large number of observations and lack of memory available
in the system where the data is used11. In the analysis of the second trial
the model (6.3) is in the form
11The data is used in Statistics Finland’s FIONA remote computer service, which has
limitations in how much memory a user can use.
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it + εit (6.10)
where coefficients θk are the periodic treatment effects. In the model, γi
and λt are individual and time fixed effects, respectively. Variables D
k
it are
interactions between the treatment and time variable, meaning that they
equal 1 if individual i is treated and t = k. The treatment indicator for
period −1 is omitted. Standard errors at the individual level, but I show
the main results also with standard errors clustered by municipality. The
outcome variable Yit is a dummy variable indicating e.g. unemployment,
extended unemployment12, or participation in activation.
Since the outcome variable is dichotomous, the analysis could also be done
using logit or probit models instead of linear probability model. These models
are, however, harder two interpret than the OLS, hence the baseline method
used is the OLS. In the analysis of the second trial, I estimate also logit
model to see if it gives similar results. The logit estimations are conducted
with the following specification:
log
P (Yit = 1)
1− P (Yit = 1)





it + εit (6.11)
I present the results for logit specification (model 6.11) by showing the co-
efficients θk from the model. These are the difference-in-differences in the
logarithm of the odds, whereas in the OLS specification the difference-in-
differences estimates were in the probability of the outcome. Difference in
the logarithm of the odds is not as easy to interpret, but the logit estimates
are useful to determine if there is an effect or not.
12Extended unemployment is defined here similarly to Arnkil et al. (2019). In this




In the first trial the participants cannot be identified, so the treated units are
municipalities. The aim of the 2012–2015 analysis is to extend the municipal
level analyses in Nieminen et al. (2020) using individual level data. In the
analysis, I first use data that has the working-age individuals for every year in
the treated and control municipalities (see Appendix D) and estimate yearly
treatment effects on employment and unemployment at the end of a year.
First, the analysis is conducted using municipality and year fixed effects and
no controls. The treatment effects from this specification are presented in
Figure 4.
Figure 4: Treatment effects (2012–2015), specification 1
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model (6.9). The
coefficients are yearly treatment effects and the coefficient of period
−1 (2011) is normalized to zero. Specification includes municipality
and year fixed effects.
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As can be seen from the Figure 4, there are no significant effects on the
probabilities of unemployment or employment. However, the point estimates
during the trial are positive for employment and there is also seems to be a
dip in unemployment after the trial started. Similar phenomenon was found
in the municipal-level analysis by Nieminen et al. (2020).
Individual level controls can be added to the model to see if they reduce
the standard errors or change the estimates. Figure 5 presents the results
from otherwise similar specification as earlier, but with controls for gender,
age, living in an urban area and upper secondary education.
Figure 5: Treatment effects (2012–2015), specification 2
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model (6.9). The
coefficients are yearly treatment effects and the coefficient of period
−1 (2011) is normalized to zero. Specification includes municipality
and year fixed effects as well as individual level controls for gender,
age, living in an urban area and upper secondary education.
When the controls are added (Figure 5), estimated effects are similar to the
estimates without controls. The standard errors are somewhat smaller: in
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the specification without controls the standard errors of the post-treatment
coefficients were between 0.0024 and 0.0028 and now they are between 0.0022
and 0.0026. Despite the reduction in standard errors, the point estimates
insignificant. In Figure 6, further controls are added, including previous
year’s income, unemployment months and employment months.
Figure 6: Treatment effects (2012–2015), specification 3
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model (6.9). The
coefficients are yearly treatment effects and the coefficient of period
−1 (2011) is normalized to zero. Specification includes municipality
and year fixed effects as well as individual level controls for gender,
age, living in an urban area, upper secondary education, previous
year’s income, unemployment months and employment months.
In Figure 6, where also the lagged employment and income controls are in-
cluded, we see that also the point estimates change. Still, however, the point
estimates are positive for employment and negative for unemployment dur-
ing the first three years after the trial. The pre-trends in employment do not
look very good, since the point estimates appear to be increasing before the
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start of treatment. None of the pre-treatment coefficients are statistically
different from zero, though.
I also want to do the analysis using individual fixed effects instead of
municipality fixed effects. The problem with individual fixed effects is that
the standard errors cannot be clustered at the municipality level if the same
individual lives in different municipalities in different years. In order to make
the municipalities have same individuals every year, I delete individuals who
move to other municipality during this time. This procedure may impact
the results, since those who don’t move are probably different from those
who move. This, however, affects both treated and control municipalities.
Figure 7 presents yearly treatment effects from the individual fixed effects
regressions without controls.
Figure 7: Treatment effects (2012–2015), specification 4
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model (6.9). The
coefficients are yearly treatment effects and the coefficient of period
−1 (2011) is normalized to zero. Specification includes individual
and year fixed effects.
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As can be seen from Figure 7, a statistically significant effect of 0.005 on
probability of employment is found. This means an increase in employment
probability by 0.5 percentage points. In unemployment probability, we do not
find statistically significant effects, though the decrease in point estimates is
still present. Since the probability of employment increased but probability of
unemployment did not decrease significantly, this result would imply that the
probability of employment increased because the trial increased employment
of those outside the labor force. This would be consistent with the findings
of Lundin and Skedinger (2006) who found that municipal programs may
target outsiders in the labor market.
Figure 8: Treatment effects (2012–2015), specification 5
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model (6.9). The
coefficients are yearly treatment effects and the coefficient of period
−1 (2011) is normalized to zero. Specification includes individual
and year fixed effects as well as individual level controls for gender,
age, living in an urban area and upper secondary education.
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In Figure 8 above, gender, age, living in an urban area and upper secondary
education are added as controls. With added controls, the effect on employ-
ment probability is still there and is significant. Overall, the added controls
do not really change the results compared to not having any controls. Fig-
ure 9 below presents treatment effects from a specification where controls for
previous year’s income, unemployment months and employment months are
added.
Figure 9: Treatment effects (2012–2015), specification 6
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model (6.9). The
coefficients are yearly treatment effects and the coefficient of period
−1 (2011) is normalized to zero. Specification includes individual
and year fixed effects as well as individual level controls for gender,
age, living in an urban area, upper secondary education, previous
year’s income, unemployment months and employment months.
Now, the increase in employment during the trial is still around 0.5 percent-
age points, but the effect is only significant in 2014. The effect on employ-
ment is found in all specifications where individual fixed effects are used and
is therefore robust to adding controls.
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7.2 Second trial
In the evaluation of the second municipal employment trial, I study the effects
on the probabilities of unemployment, extended unemployment, activation
and sanctions. Additionally, I investigate how the trial affected the prob-
ability of participation in 5 different types of activation services: coaching,
studying, work trials, rehabilitative work programs and labour force training.
This chapter presents the results for 5 different trial areas (Varsinais-Suomi,
Pirkanmaa, Pohjois-Savo, Lappi and Pori) in subchapters 7.2.1 – 7.2.5.
Since employment is only observed yearly and the latest information is
from 2017, the main measure used to investigate employment effects is the
’extended unemployment’ variable, which means both those who are reg-
istered as unemployed as well as those who are participating in activation
services. In the figures, this variable is named ’Unemployed + Services’.
As mentioned in the Methods chapter, both OLS (fixed effects) and logit
results are calculated. The OLS results are, however, the main analyses, while
results from logit specifications are mainly presented as robustness checks to
see if they give similar results. Therefore, logit results are not presented in all
areas or outcome variables and are not discussed as thoroughly as the OLS
results. Some logit results are presented in the Results chapter and some in
the Appendix E.
7.2.1 Varsinais-Suomi area
In Varsinais-Suomi area, the analysis is conducted in two ways: first, partic-
ipants under the age of 25 in Varsinais-Suomi area are compared to matched
non-treated, under 25-year-old individuals from other areas13. After this
13The control group is created using propensity score matching with variables listed in
subsection 6.2. The balance tables after matching are presented in Appendix A.
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analysis, outcomes of Varsinais-Suomi residents just under the 25-year thresh-
old (born in 1993) are compared to individuals a little older than 25 (born
in 1991), who live in Varsinais-Suomi. No matching is used in the second
analysis.
The main results (participants in Varsinais-Suomi vs. matched controls)
can be found in Figure 10. The figure presents bimonthly treatment effects
(effects for 2-month periods) on unemployment, extended unemployment,
participation in activation, and sanctions in Varsinais-Suomi area. The ef-
fects are coefficients θk from model (6.10). As noted earlier, the coefficient
for period −1 is omitted, since it is the baseline period. Standard errors are
clustered on the individual level. Coefficients of this main model can also be
found in the regression tables in Appendix A.2.
Figure 10: Varsinais-Suomi, main results
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model (6.10). The
coefficients are monthly treatment effects and the coefficient of period
−1 (July 2017) is normalized to zero.
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As can be seen from Figure 10, the trial did not have effects on the probability
of unemployment or the probability of extended unemployment, except for
the short term increase, lasting only one period. This increase could be e.g.
because of probems in start of the trial or it could just be random. The
pre-trends are otherwise zero, except for the coefficient 15 months before the
start of the trial. During the trial, the treatment effects on unemployment
do not differ from zero statistically significantly, meaning that no effect on
unemployment is seen during the 15 months after the trial started.
Probability of ALMP participation rose briefly during the trial: the point
estimates for periods 7 and 9 indicate an increase of 2.5 percentage points
on the probability of activation. The effect vanishes when the trial ends.
The most interesting result in Varsinais-Suomi area trial is the decrease in
sanctions by almost one percentage point. The effect on sanctions persists
and is still there when 15 months has passed since the trial. The reduced
sanctions result is in line with the result Mergele and Weber (2020) found
in the German reform. It is also in line with my theoretical predictions.
The size of the result is still very surprising: 1 percentage point decrease in
sanctions means over 10 percent decrease in relative terms.14
Since observations from the same municipality can be correlated, the
standard errors may be wrong. To solve this problem, standard errors could
be clustered at the municipal level instead of individual level. Figure 11
below presents the same results as before, but with standard errors clustered
by municipality. As can be seen from Figure 11, clustering the standard
errors on the municipal level doesn’t change the results: effects on activation
and sanctions are still significant.
14This is because the probability of being sanctioned is around 9 percent before treat-
ment. If it decreases 1 percentage point, this is a change of 0.08−0.090.09 ∗ 100% = −11%
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Figure 11: Varsinais-Suomi, clustering on municipality
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model (6.10). The
coefficients are monthly treatment effects and the coefficient of period
−1 (July 2017) is normalized to zero.
As the outcome variables are dichotomous, the results from logistic DiD-
specification (model 6.11) are also useful to address whether or not there are
any effects. The results using logit specification can be found in Figure 12
below. When using logit specification, the results look quite similar: no effect
on the probability of unemployment. In the logit specification, however, no
effect on ALMP participation is found. The reduced sanctions result is also
found with the logit specification. This means that the trial had a negative
effect on the logarithm of the odds of being sanctioned.
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Figure 12: Varsinais-Suomi, logit estimates
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model (6.11). The
coefficients are monthly treatment effects and the coefficient of period
−1 (July 2017) is normalized to zero.
Figures 13 and 14 present the effects of the trial on probabilities of par-
ticipating in different ALMP types. In Figure 15 presents the results from
OLS specification and Figure 14 presents results from logit specification. As
can be seen from Figure 13, the trial did not change the types of activation
services provided to job seekers. The pre-trends are unfortunately not zero
in all of the ALMP types; this may be because the number of individuals
participating in specific ALMP programs is quite small and volatile. Figure
14 plots the logit esimates of the effects on ALMP types: no effects there
either. Therefore, there is no evidence for cost-shifting through changing
ALMP types in Varsinais-Suomi.
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Figure 13: Varsinais-Suomi, ALMP types
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model (6.10).
The coefficients are monthly treatment effects and the
coefficient of period −1 (July 2017) is normalized to zero.
Figure 14: Varsinais-Suomi, ALMP types (logit)
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model (6.10).
The coefficients are monthly treatment effects and the
coefficient of period −1 (July 2017) is normalized to zero.
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In Varsinais-Suomi area the analysis can also be done inside the area, by
comparing individuals in both sides of the 25-year-threshold in treatment
assignment. The results from this setting are presented in Figure 15. The
results are similar to the results above: no effect on the probability of un-
employment or activation. The reduction in sanctions is found also in this
setting, indicating robustness of the result. Finding no effect inside Varsinais-
Suomi is consistent with the findings by Ylikännö et al. (2019).
Figure 15: Varsinais-Suomi, born in 1993 vs. 1991
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model (6.10). The
coefficients are monthly treatment effects and the coefficient of
period −1 (July 2017) is normalized to zero.
7.2.2 Pirkanmaa area
Pirkanmaa area trial is the most challenging of the 5 areas when it comes
to the parallel trends assumption. Various matchings were tested, but there
is always a drop in the probability of unemployment in the treatment group
just before the start of the trial. Therefore, the pre-trends are not parallel
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in many of the outcome variables. I hypothesize that this is due to the
interviews conducted for job seekers in Pirkanmaa at that time. If the pre-
trends were coerced to be the same with matching (that is, using indicators
for unemployment in each pre-treatment month in matching), the estimated
effects would be similar to the results presented in this Chapter. I choose to
present the results where this is not done, but instead the matching in done
with variables presented before, in subsection 6.2. Figure 16 presents results
in Pirkanmaa area.
Figure 16: Pirkanmaa, main results
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model (6.10). The
coefficients are monthly treatment effects and the coefficient of
period −1 (July 2017) is normalized to zero.
As can be seen from Figure 16, the trial briefly increases the probability of
being registered as unemployed, but as the trial progresses, the probability
of unemployment decreases clearly in the treatment group. This may explain
why the Pirkanmaa area trial has received praise in the media. The decrease
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in registered unemployment does not, however, mean that employment would
have increased: in fact, the trial first increases the probability of extended
unemployment (Unemployed + Services) and in later months the treatment
effects on extended unemployment are zero. The reason for the reduction
in registered unemployment is that more people were directed to activation,
which makes them not appear as unemployed in the register. The effect
on activation is very sizable: an increase of over 7 percentage points in the
probability of participating in activation.
The trial has also a sizable effect on the probability of receiving benefit
sanctions: sanctions are reduced by 1 percentage points in Pirkanmaa area.
The size of the result is similar to the result found in Varsinais-Suomi and
it can be considered quite sizeable. The result on sanctions is presented in
a single plot in Appendix E, since the results is hard to read from Figure
16 due to the scale on the vertical axis. As reducing sanctions can be one
channel for the municipality to shift costs to the central government, this
finding supports the hypothesis that municipalities would try to shift costs
to the central government.
Results with standard errors clustered at the municipality level instead
of individual level are presented in the Figure 17. When the standard errors
are clustered by municipality, they increase visibly: in fact, the pre-trends
look much better with the clustered errors. The effects on registered un-
employment, activation and sanctions are all still significant, meaning that
they are robust to the cluster correction of standard errors by municipal-
ity. The effect on extended unemployment is, however, not significant when
standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Hence, the results
with clustered standard errors would imply that the Pirkanmaa trial did not
affect employment during the 15-month period after the start of the trial. It
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did, however, decrease unemployment by increasing participation in ALMP
services.
Figure 17: Pirkanmaa, clustered standard errors
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model (6.10). The
coefficients are monthly treatment effects and the coefficient of
period −1 (July 2017) is normalized to zero.
Estimated effects on the ALMP types in Pirkanmaa area can be found in
Figure 18. Clearly, there is a gradual increase in rehabilitative work pro-
grams and a sharp decrease in studying (in Finnish: omaehtoinen opiskelu).
Additionally, there is a negative effect on the probability of participating
in labour force training. Hence, we can conclude that the Pirkanmaa area
trial increased rehabilitative work programs, which can be considered public
employment schemes. These types of ALMP programs were found to be the
least effective in empirical ALMP literature Kluve (2016) The decrease in
studying and training is also worrisome, since training is one of the more
effective types of ALMP according to Kluve (2016). In addition to the shift
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in ALMP types being possibly towards less effective programs, the increase
in rehabilitative work programs in Pirkanmaa indicates that municipalities
in Pirkanmaa area may have tried to shift costs to the central government.
Figure 18: Pirkanmaa, ALMP types
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model (6.10). The
coefficients are monthly treatment effects and the coefficient of
period −1 (July 2017) is normalized to zero.
The key story from Pirkanmaa area trial is that activation increased sub-
stantially, but the activation was mainly in the form of rehabilitative work
programs. Since studying and labour force training were reduced, they were
probably replaced with rehabilitative work, i.e. some job seekers who could
have otherwise been directed to studying or training, may have been directed
to rehabilitative work programs during the trial. No employment effects were
found in the 15 month period after the results, but such effects could occur in
a longer time frame, if the increased ALMP participation helped job seekers.
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7.2.3 Pohjois-Savo area
Figure 19: Pohjois-Savo, main results
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model (6.10). The
coefficients are monthly treatment effects and the coefficient of period
−1 (July 2017) is normalized to zero.
Figure 19 presents the main results in Pohjois-Savo area. In Pohjois-Savo,
no effects are found except for the probability of activation, where a nega-
tive effect is found in periods 9 and 11. The negative effect on activation
in Pohjois-Savo is probably attributed to replacing rehabilitative work pro-
grams with the municipalities’ own work experience program15. The work
experience program had, however, less participants than were previously in
labour force training. Hence, the ALMP participation actually decreased in
Pohjois-Savo, which is an unexpected result. The pre-trends look otherwise
good, expect for the coefficients in periods −16 and −14 in unemployment
15see Annala et al. (2019)
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and extended unemployment. Estimates with standard errors clustered at
the municipality level are presented in Figure 20.
Figure 20: Pohjois-Savo, clustering by municipality
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model (6.10). The
coefficients are monthly treatment effects and the coefficient of period
−1 (July 2017) is normalized to zero.
The effects on different ALMP types in Pohjois-Savo are plotted in Figure
21. The new work experience program in Pohjois-Savo was coded with same
service code in the data as the rehabilitative work programs it replaced, but
as can be seen from Figure 21 fewer participants participated in the program
than used to participate in rehabilitative work programs. Regarding other
ALMP types, studying increased statistically significantly. By looking at the
effects on the ALMP types, Pohjois-Savo looks like an opposite of Pirkanmaa:
in Pohjois-Savo rehabilitative work decreases and studying increases, whereas
the opposite was true in the Pirkanmaa trial area.
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Figure 21: Pohjois-Savo, ALMP types
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model (6.10). The
coefficients are monthly treatment effects and the coefficient of period
−1 (July 2017) is normalized to zero.
7.2.4 Lappi area
The main results in Lappi area are presented in Figure 22: short term de-
crease in registered unemployment (lasting one period), increase in extended
unemployment and increase in activation by over 3 percentage points are
found. The trial has no effect on sanctions. The increase in extended unem-
ployment is driven by the increase in activation, as the registered unemploy-
ment does not rise. It will take longer time to see if the increased activation
results in better employment prospects. Figure 23 presents the results with
standard errors clustered at the municipality level. Clustering on municipal-
ity level makes the estimates largely insignificant, although some effects on
probability of activation are still significant.
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Figure 22: Lappi, main results
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model (6.10).
The coefficients are monthly treatment effects and the
coefficient of period −1 (July 2017) is normalized to zero.
Figure 23: Lappi, clustering by municipality
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model (6.10).
The coefficients are monthly treatment effects and the
coefficient of period −1 (July 2017) is normalized to zero.
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The effects on ALMP types can be seen from Figure 24 below. There are no
big changes in ALMP types in Lappi area during the trial, but the proba-
bility of participating in coaching increases statistically significantly, as does
participation in work trials during one period.
Figure 24: Lappi, ALMP types
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model (6.10). The
coefficients are monthly treatment effects and the coefficient of period
−1 (July 2017) is normalized to zero.
7.2.5 Pori area
In Pori trial area, there was just one treated municipality: the city of Pori.
Since the treatment group consists of under 25-year-olds who have been un-
employed over 6 months, the sample size is rather small: in the treatment
group there are only 181 individuals, whereas in other areas there were thou-
sands of participants, and even over ten thousand (in Pirkanmaa).
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Figure 25: Pori, main results
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model (6.10). The
coefficients are monthly treatment effects and the coefficient of period
−1 (July 2017) is normalized to zero.
Figure 25 shows main results in Pori area. The trial had no effects on ex-
tended unemployment, activation or sanctions. Registered unemployment
decreased such that the coefficient for period 15 is negative and statistically
significant. In Figure 26, effects on ALMP types in Pori are showed: reha-
bilitative work programs decreased, but no other effects are found.
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Figure 26: Pori, ALMP types
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model (6.10). The
coefficients are monthly treatment effects and the coefficient of period
−1 (July 2017) is normalized to zero.
7.3 Robustness and validity
7.3.1 Pre-trends
In the figures where treatment effects are presented, the validity of the par-
allel trends assumption can be evaluated by looking at the pre-treatment
coefficients. If the assumption holds, the coefficients should not be statis-
tically different from zero. This tests whether the difference of treatment
and control groups has been constant before the treatment: since the co-
efficient for period −1 is omitted, the differences in other other periods are
compared to the difference in period −1. If the difference between groups did
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not change in any period before the trial (as the identification assumption
requires), the pre-treatment coefficients should be zero.
Judging from the Figures, the pre-trends seem to be parallel in the fist
trial. In the second trial, however, the trends are not parallel in all areas or all
outcome variables. The pre-trends look problematic especially in Pirkanmaa,
where activation interviews were conducted just before the start of the mu-
nicipal employment trial. Those interviews caused a dip in the probability of
unemployment before the trial, since more unemployment spells were ended
in Pirkanmaa at that time. Since the control individuals were from other ar-
eas than Pirkanmaa, they were not affected by these interviews, which caused
a change in trends. This problem in parallel trends is not however present
in the result concerning the reduction in sanctions: in that result, pre-trends
look parallel.
The pre-treatment coefficients can also be tested jointly; this means test-
ing simultaneously whether all the coefficients are zero using F-test. The
results of joint significance test performed for pre-treatment coefficients in
the 2012-2015 analyses are presented in Table 3. For the second trial, results
of the F-test are listed in Table 4 for main outcomes. Table 3 indicates that
all the pre-treatment coefficients in the analysis of the first trial are in fact
zero. Hence, the parallel trends can be assumed to hold in the analysis of
the 2012–2015 trial. In the second trial, pre-trends are not zero in all areas
or outcome variables according to the F-test of joint significance.
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Table 3: Pre-trends, joint significance (12–15)
Outcome Specification F value p-value
Employment 1 1.34 0.25
Employment 2 1.42 0.21
Employment 3 1.22 0.30
Employment 4 0.72 0.64
Employment 5 0.81 0.56
Employment 6 0.70 0.65
Unemployment 1 0.34 0.92
Unemployment 2 0.33 0.92
Unemployment 3 0.39 0.89
Unemployment 4 0.49 0.82
Unemployment 5 0.48 0.82
Unemployment 6 0.49 0.82
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Table 4: Pre-trends, joint significance (17–18)
Area Outcome F value p-value
Varsinais-Suomi Unemployed 2.81 0.02
Varsinais-Suomi Unemployed + Services 1.23 0.27
Varsinais-Suomi Activation 2.00 0.04
Varsinais-Suomi Sanctions 0.88 0.55
Pirkanmaa Unemployed 2.65 0.004
Pirkanmaa Unemployed + Services 3.21 < 0.001
Pirkanmaa Activation 3.86 < 0.001
Pirkanmaa Sanctions 0.75 0.66
Lappi Unemployed 0.88 0.55
Lappi Unemployed + Services 0.50 0.88
Lappi Activation 1.31 0.23
Lappi Sanctions 1.33 0.22
Pohjois-Savo Unemployed 2.04 0.03
Pohjois-Savo Unemployed + Services 1.65 0.10
Pohjois-Savo Activation 1.29 0.24
Pohjois-Savo Sanctions 0.51 0.87
Pori Unemployed 0.39 0.94
Pori Unemployed + Services 0.55 0.84
Pori Activation 0.64 0.76
Pori Sanctions 0.73 0.68
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7.3.2 Placebo outcomes
The validity of treatment and control groups can also be examined by looking
at the effects on placebo outcomes. This means checking if the design pro-
duces an effect, even if there should not be one. I do the placebo outcomes
check for all 5 trial areas in the 2017–2018 trial, using the same treatment
and control groups (created using matching) as in the analysis. The placebo
outcomes used are probability of living in an urban area, household size,
having a car, number of rooms, number of kids and family size. As the ba-
sic variables are available yearly, I calculate yearly treatment effects on this
placebo outcomes.
Figure 27: Placebo outcomes, Lappi
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model (6.10). The
coefficients are monthly treatment effects and the coefficient of period
−1 (July 2017) is normalized to zero.
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Figure 28: Placebo outcomes, Pori
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model (6.10). The
coefficients are monthly treatment effects and the coefficient of period
−1 (year 2017) is normalized to zero.
As can be seen from Figures 27 and 28, the trial does not have any statistically
significant effects on these placebo outcomes in Lappi or Pori areas: in the
Lappi area, the point estimates are very close to zero, whereas in the Pori
area some outcomes (family size, number of rooms, number of kids) are only
barely insignificant. Fortunately, all effects are insignifcant, as they should
be, since there are no reasons to believe the trial would affect these outcomes.
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Figure 29: Placebo outcomes, Pirkanmaa
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model (6.10). The
coefficients are monthly treatment effects and the coefficient of period
−1 (year 2017) is normalized to zero.
In Pirkanmaa area (Figure 29), there are no placebo effects (meaning effects
after the start of treatment with parallel pre-trends), but the pre-trends are
not parallel in some of the placebo outcomes, i.e. in urban area and or in
number of rooms. This is not ideal and may indicate that the treatment and
control groups used in Pirkanmaa area evaluation are not valid. This kind
of judgement should, however, not be based on this test only.
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Figure 30: Placebo outcomes, Varsinais-Suomi
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model (6.10). The
coefficients are monthly treatment effects and the coefficient of period
−1 (year 2017) is normalized to zero.
In Varsinais-Suomi area (Figure 30), the placebo outcome tests give results
similar to the results from Pirkanmaa: in some outcomes, the trends are not
parallel. At the start of treatment, however, no effect is found as expected.
All of the variables with non-parallel pre-trends are related to the household
size (household size, family size, number of kids). The treatment and control
groups seem to have different trends in this type of variables. The dissim-
ilarity of the pre-trends in placebo outcomes in Varsinais-Suomi area raises
concerns about the validity of the treatment and control groups.
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Figure 31: Placebo outcomes, Pohjois-Savo
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model (6.10). The
coefficients are monthly treatment effects and the coefficient of period
−1 (year 2017) is normalized to zero.
In Pohjois-Savo, the effects on placebo outcomes (Figure 31) are not signif-
icant and the point estimates are very close to zero. Thus, when effects on
placebo outcomes have been investigated in all 5 areas, it can be concluded
that in 3 areas (Lappi, Pori, Pohjois-Savo) the placebo outcome tests sup-
port the validity of the design, whereas in two areas (Varsinais-Suomi and
Pirkanmaa), it gives less promising results. Possible issues with the validity
of the treament and control groups in both Pirkanmaa and Varsinais-Suomi
have, therefore, been found both in the joint significance test for pre-trends
as well as in this placebo outcome check.
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7.4 Internal and external validity
Since the pre-trends are parallel in the analyses of the first trial (2012–2015),
it seems that parallel trends can be assumed. Hence, the results of the first
trial seem to be internally valid. That is, the method should identify the av-
erage causal effect of the treatment. Regarding external validity, the results
from specifications 1–3 are better, since they include all working-age indi-
viduals in treated and control municipalities. This means that the estimated
effects could be interpreted as effects on net employment. In the specifica-
tions 4–6, movers were removed in order to be able to cluster standard errors
by municipality in an individual level fixed effects model. The removal of
those who have moved may weaken the external validity of the results.
The second trial is more problematic. First, matching was used, which
may increase the bias of the DiD-estimator (Chabé-Ferret, 2017). Further,
the use of PSM as a matching method has been discredited strongly by King
and Nielsen (2019). Secondly, the pre-trends are not parallel in some outcome
variables in some areas; this is the case especially in Pirkanmaa area, where
the activation interviews were arranged just before the start of the municipal
employment trial. The pre-trends in the result regarding the reduction of
sanctions in Pirkanmaa are, however, parallel. In other areas, pre-trends are
parallel in most outcome variables.
As a robustness check, effects on placebo outcomes were investigated in all
trial areas in the second trial. Testing placebo outcomes yielded no effects
in Pori, Pohjois-Savo or Lappi, indicating that the treatment and control
groups in those areas are valid. In Pirkanmaa and Varsinais-Suomi areas,
the trends were not pre-trends were not parallel in some placebo outcome
variables. There were, however, no placebo effects, meaning instances where
the trends would have been similar before but not after the trial. Although
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the internal validity of the results can be questioned, the causal interpration
of the results is in my view possible, at least in some areas and outcome
variables.
The estimated effects are average treatment effects on the treated. Hence,
they have to be interpreted as effects on the treated population (e.g. long-
term unemployed in Pohjois-Savo and Lappi, or under 25-year-olds in Varsinais-
Suomi). Effects for these groups may not be generalizable to other groups.
Hence, the results may not reflect what the effects would be if everyone was
moved to a decentralized system. There are also additional concerns: since
this was an experiment, municipalities may not have all the resources they
would if this was a permanent reform. Recruiting employees and the devel-
opment of services may for instance have been inadequate. Because of these
concerns, this evidence does not rule out that decentralization of employment
services could have favourable effects.
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8 Conclusions
The results from the two trials are different, as were the trials themselves: in
the first trial an effect on employment was found, whereas the results indicate
that the second trial did not have employment effects. This can be interpreted
such that decentralization of employment services (the second trial) does
not increase employment, but additional employment services provided by
municipalities (the first trial), may have employment effects.
The results of the 2017–2018 trial are similar to Mergele and Weber (2020)
in that the decentralization seems to have negative employment effects (rise
in extended unemployment) at least in some areas. The results are similar to
many active labor market policy evaluations: especially the short term effects
in some areas are negative (a rise in unemployment), but the long-term point
estimates are closer to zero.
In some areas the second trial shifted the focus of activation to different
services: e.g. probability of participation in rehabibilitative work programs
increased substantially – 10 percentage points – in Pirkanmaa during the
trial. This has been already noted earlier by others, and it has been critized
since rehabilitative work programs should by law only be for those who are
in need of rehabilitation. The increase in rehabilititive work programs in
Pirkanmaa can also be seen as evidence on the cost-shifting municipalities
may do if they are given the responsibility to arrange employment services.
The effects on benefit sanctions were studied because of the hypothe-
sis that municipalities would optimize their expenses and therefore decrease
benefit sanctions. This would be due to the fact that municipalities have
to pay 50 percent of income support and housing allowance. Decrease in
sanctions was found in two areas, Pirkanmaa and Varsinais-Suomi, which
are the biggest trial areas in terms of population. The reduction in sanctions
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may very well be a mechanism lowering employment, since reduced sanctions
lowers the incentives of individuals to seek employment.
If the decentralization reform is implemented, this study suggests that the
incentives of municipalities have to be designed in such a way that there are
no incentives to give less sanctions. Earlier research by Lundin and Skedinger
(2006) as well as Mergele and Weber (2020) also suggests that municipalities
may try to do cost-shifting, so the government should not implement this
reform without first designing the system carefully so that the cost-shifting
opportunities are minimized. The incentive structure could be designed in
such a way that municipalities would have incentives to get job seekers em-
ployed. There could still, however, be a danger that municipalities would be
less strict in sanctioning than employment offices, due to the objectives of
local politicians.
Only looking at employment effects of the trials has been criticised by
some: authors of the Pirkanmaa municipal level analysis (Arnkil et al., 2019)
argue in Kuntalehti (2019) that the trials may have had impacts on the
paths that some long term job seekers are. According to them, it is not
even possible to get these people employed right away but instead these
services can improve their quality of life and may in very long-term yield
better employment outcomes. This claim may very well be true, but since
the possible full decentralization reform is planned to affect everyone, it is
not very convincing to rationalize not seeing any employment effects by using
this argument.
Decentralization may be a plausible way to reform employment services,
but in the light of previous research and the results of this study, it would
be very optimistic to expect huge employment effects. Therefore, the reform
should not be thought as a tool to increase employment.
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A Appendix: Matching tables
Table A.1: Varsinais-Suomi, after matching
Variable Treated Control t value p value
Length of unemployment 3.718 3.730 -0.07 0.85
Education.2 0.019 0.014 1.06 0.29
Education.3 0.603 0.605 -0.10 0.92
Education.4 0.277 0.296 -1.20 0.23
Education.5 0.079 0.069 1.10 0.27
Activation, last 12 months 0.299 0.305 -0.41 0.69
Age 21.43 21.42 0.18 0.85
Gender.2 (woman) 0.48 0.48 0.00 1.00
Urban area 0.95 0.96 -0.33 0.75
Size of family 1.92 1.92 0.14 0.89
Marital status.2 0.048 0.045 0.48 0.63
Marital status.3 0.005 0.002 1.39 0.17
Marital status.4 0.0006 0.0006 0.00 1.00
Number of observations 1746 1746
Notes. Length of unemployment means the number of consecutive un-
employment months when the trial started. Education variable is from
TEM Työnhakija module and has the following categories: 1 = folk
school, 2 = middle school, 3 = comprehensive school, 4 = high school,
5 = other. Since everyone is under 25 years old in this matching, no-
body should have education levels 1 or 2 (folk schools or middle schools
have not existed in their lifetimes). Hence, the data has some errors
(individuals in Education.1 or Education.2 should be in some other cat-
egory). Marital status has the following categories: 1 = not married, 2
= married or in registered union, 3 = divorced, 4 = widow.
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Table A.2: Pirkanmaa, after matching
Variable Treated Control t value p value
Length of unemployment 12.192 12.436 -1.54 0.12
Unemployment months, last 12 months 8.681 8.656 0.54 0.59
Gender.2 (woman) 0.447 0.446 0.12 0.90
Urban area 0.933 0.932 0.14 0.89
Employed in 2015 0.101 0.102 -0.36 0.72
Employed in 2016 0.078 0.082 -1.26 0.21
Marital status.2 0.246 0.235 2.20 0.03
Marital status.3 0.139 0.137 0.33 0.74
Marital status.4 0.0070 0.0054 1.68 0.09
Age 37.46 37.54 -0.53 0.60
Size of family 2.03 1.98 3.28 0.001
Number of observations 13 876 13 876
Notes. Length of unemployment means the number of consecutive unemployment months
when the trial started. Marital status has the following categories: 1 = not married, 2
= married or in registered union, 3 = divorced, 4 = widow.
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Table A.3: Pohjois-Savo, after matching
Variable Treated Control t value p value
Length of unemployment 24.87 25.67 -1.38 0.17
Unemployed under 12 months 0.116 0.109 0.51 0.613
Education.2 0.128 0.26 0.18 0.86
Education.3 0.304 0.322 -0.99 0.32
Education.4 0.322 0.306 0.86 0.39
Education.5 0.030 0.032 -0.23 0.82
Activation, last 12 months 0.072 0.074 -0.15 0.88
Age 50.4 50.5 -0.28 0.78
Gender.2 (woman) 0.494 0.496 -0.12 0.91
Urban area 0.84 0.87 -1.92 0.06
Size of family 2.07 1.97 2.07 0.04
Marital status.2 0.40 0.41 -0.32 0.75
Marital status.3 0.21 0.21 0.15 0.88
Marital status.4 0.023 0.025 -0.39 0.70
Number of observations 1254 1254
Notes. Length of unemployment means the number of consecutive unem-
ployment months when the trial started. Education variable is from TEM
Työnhakija module and has the following categories: 1 = folk school, 2 =
middle school, 3 = comprehensive school, 4 = high school, 5 = other. Mar-
ital status has the following categories: 1 = not married, 2 = married or in
registered union, 3 = divorced, 4 = widow.
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Table A.4: Lappi, after matching
Variable Treated Control t value p value
Length of unemployment 24.95 24.85 0.27 0.79
Unemployment months, last 12 months 11.913 11.913 -0.00 1.00
Unemployed under 12 months 0.02 0.02 -0.00 1.00
Education.2 0.096 0.095 0.11 0.91
Education.3 0.48 0.48 0.00 1.00
Education.4 0.198 0.201 -0.24 0.81
Education.5 0.03 0.03 0.76 0.45
Activation, last 12 months 0.05 0.04 1.69 0.09
Age 50.6 50.7 -0.21 0.83
Gender.2 (woman) 0.41 0.41 0.16 0.87
Number of observations 1974 1974
Notes. Length of unemployment means the number of consecutive unemployment months
when the trial started. Education variable is from TEM Työnhakija module and has the
following categories: 1 = folk school, 2 = middle school, 3 = comprehensive school, 4 = high
school, 5 = other.
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Table A.5: Pori, after matching
Variable Treated Control t value p value
Length of unemployment 7.99 8.08 -0.15 0.88
Unemployment months in 12 months 9.34 9.36 -0.07 0.94
Education.2 0.01 0.006 0.58 0.56
Education.3 0.67 0.73 -1.15 0.25
Education.4 0.22 0.20 0.51 0.61
Education.5 0.07 0.05 0.88 0.38
Work years.1 0.19 0.18 0.40 0.69
Work years.2 0.07 0.03 1.74 0.08
Work years.3 0.027 0.027 0.00 1.00
Work years.4 0 0 . .
Work years.5 0 0 . .
Work years. 6 0 0 . .
Employed in 2016.4 0.09 0.08 0.38 0.70
Employed in 2015.5 0.12 0.10 0.50 0.62
Age 21.66 21.60 0.44 0.66
Gender.2 (woman) 0.47 0.45 0.42 0.67
Number of observations 181 181
Notes. Length of unemployment means the number of consecutive unemployment months
when the trial started. Education variable is from TEM Työnhakija module and has the
following categories: 1 = folk school, 2 = middle school, 3 = comprehensive school, 4 = high
school, 5 = other. Work years variable indicates how many years an individual has been
employed between 2011 and 2016.
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B Appendix: Regression tables
Table B.6: Regression table (employment), 12-15
Employment
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
















































































































































Basic controls X X X X
Further controls X X
Municipality FE X X X
Individual FE X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
R2 0.003 0.158 0.634 0.014 0.107 0.620
N 17.3 million 17.3 million 17.3 million 9.4 million 9.4 million 9.4 million
Notes. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table B.7: Regression table (unemployment), 12-15
Unemployment
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
















































































































































Basic controls X X X X
Further controls X X
Municipality FE X X X
Individual FE X X X
Year FE X X X X X X
R2 0.002 0.018 0.233 0.0008 0.009 0.043
N 17.3 million 17.3 million 17.3 million 9.4 million 9.4 million 9.4 million
Notes. Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Individual FE X X X X
Month FE X X X X
R2 0.135 0.015 0.103 0.007
N 62 442 62 442 62 442 62 442
Notes. Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Individual FE X X X X
Month FE X X X X
R2 0.082 0.025 0.042 0.004
N 497 166 497 166 497 166 497 166
Notes. Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Individual FE X X X X
Month FE X X X X
R2 0.186 0.034 0.114 0.005
N 71 028 71 028 71 028 71 028
Notes. Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Individual FE X X X X
Month FE X X X X
R2 0.211 0.024 0.163 0.004
N 6 504 6 504 6 504 6 504
Notes. Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Individual FE X X X X
Month FE X X X X
R2 0.147 0.021 0.117 0.008
N 45 096 45 096 45 096 45 096
Notes. Standard errors clustered by individual in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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C Appendix: Participating municipalities
C.1 First trial (2012-2015)
Akaa, Espoo, Hämeenlinna, Hamina, Hartola, Hattula, Heinola, Helsinki,
Hollola, Imatra, Jämsä, Janakkala, Joensuu, Jyväskylä, Kajaani, Kemi, Keu-
ruu, Kokkola, Kotka, Kuhmo, Kuopio, Lahti, Lappeenranta, Lemi, Leppävirta,
Lieksa, Luumäki, Merikarvia, Mikkeli, Muurame, Orimattila, Oulu, Out-
okumpu, Parikkala, Pomarkku, Pori, Pyhäjoki, Raahe, Ranua, Rautalampi,
Rautjärvi, Rovaniemi, Ruokolahti, Savitaipale, Savonlinna, Seinäjoki, Si-
ikajoki, Siilinjärvi, Suonenjoki, Sysmä, Taipalsaari, Tampere, Turku, Tu-
usniemi, Ulvila, Urjala, Valkeakoski, Vantaa, Varkaus
C.2 Second trial (2017-2018)
Kangasala, Kemi, Kemijärvi, Kuopio, Lempäälä, Naantali, Nokia, Orivesi,
Paimio, Pirkkala, Pori, Punkalaidun, Raisio, Rovaniemi, Sastamala, Siil-
injärvi, Sodankylä, Tampere, Tornio, Turku, Tuusniemi, Vesilahti, Ylöjärvi
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D Appendix: 12–15 trial, treatment and con-
trol groups
In the analysis of the 12–15 trial, where the unit of analysis is the munici-
pality, treatment and control groups have to be created in the municipality
level. Matching on unemployment rate, population and number of people
in activation, Nieminen et al. (2020) find 51 control municipalities for the
2012-2015 trial municipalities. 8 of the biggest treated municipalities were
discarded, leaving 51 municipalities to both the treatment and the control
group.
Treatment group: Akaa, Espoo, Hämeenlinna, Hamina, Hartola, Hat-
tula, Heinola, Hollola, Imatra, Jämsä, Janakkala, Kajaani, Kemi, Keuruu,
Kokkola, Kotka, Kuhmo, Kuopio, Lappeenranta, Lemi, Leppävirta, Lieksa,
Luumäki, Merikarvia, Mikkeli, Muurame, Orimattila, Outokumpu, Parikkala,
Pomarkku, Pori, Pyhäjoki, Raahe, Ranua, Rautalampi, Rautjärvi, Rovaniemi,
Ruokolahti, Savitaipale, Savonlinna, Seinäjoki, Siikajoki, Siilinjärvi, Suonen-
joki, Sysmä, Taipalsaari, Tuusniemi, Ulvila, Urjala, Valkeakoski, Varkaus
Control group: Äänekoski, Enontekiö, Forssa, Haapavesi, Huittinen,
Hyvinkää, Ii, Iisalmi, Jämijärvi, Kangasniemi, Kankaanpää, Kannus, Kärsämäki,
Kaskinen, Kemijärvi, Kempele, Kinnula, Kitee, Kittilä, Konnevesi, Kon-
tiolahti, Kouvola, Kuusamo, Kyyjärvi, Laitila, Loimaa, Loviisa, Mänttä-
Vilppula, Muhos, Naantali, Nokia, Nurmes, Pieksämäki, Porvoo, Pyhäntä,
Rantasalmi, Rauma, Riihimäki, Ristijärvi, Saarijärvi, Salla, Salo, Sastamala,
Suomussalmi, Tohmajärvi, Toivakka, Tornio, Utsjoki, Vaala, Vaasa, Veteli
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E Appendix: Additional Figures
Sanctions, Pirkanmaa
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model
(6.10). The coefficients are bimonthly treatment
effects and the coefficient of period −1 (July 2017) is
normalized to zero.
Logit results, Pori
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model
(6.11). The coefficients are bimonthly treatment




Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model
(6.11). The coefficients are bimonthly treatment
effects and the coefficient of period −1 (July 2017) is
normalized to zero.
Logit results, Pohjois-Savo
Notes. Figure plots regression coefficients from model
(6.11). The coefficients are bimonthly treatment
effects and the coefficient of period −1 (July 2017) is
normalized to zero.
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